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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Patrick Morrissey appeals from the district court's Amended Judgment of 
Conviction Upon a Plea of Guilty to Two Felony Counts, and Order of Commitment, 
stemming from a jury finding him guilty of arson and conspiracy to commit arson. 1 Prior 
to sentencing, the district court was provided with extensive evidence that Mr. Morrissey 
has suffered from mental illness since he was a child and the court had reason to 
believe that his condition would be a significant factor at sentencing. However, the 
district court failed to abide by the plain language of Idaho Code § 19-2522 by failing to 
order a mental health evaluation pursuant to that statute, despite the court itself 
expressing perplexity about Mr. Morrissey's mental condition. Furthermore, 
Mr. Morrissey asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Twenty-two year old Patrick Morrissey was alleged to have conspired with his 
friend, Spencer Maschak, to take Mr. Maschek's car from Twin Falls to Jerome County 
and to set the car on fire so that Mr. Maschek could collect insurance proceeds on the 
car; in exchange, Mr. Maschak would forgive a $300.00 debt owed by Mr. Morrissey. 
1 Mr. Morrissey's appellate rights were restored through a post-conviction proceeding 
and his Notice of Appeal was filed from an order entered in CV-09-3921, the post-
conviction case. (R., pp.236-239; see also Order to Remand to District Court and 
Suspend Appeal, dated September 13, 2011.) This Court suspended the appeal and 
remanded this case to the district court with instructions to re-enter a judgment in 
CR-08-2341, the criminal case. Id. The district court entered an order entitled 
Amended Judgment of Conviction Upon a Plea of Guilty to Two Felony Counts, and 
Order of Commitment, on September 16, 2011 (although the title is misleading as Mr. 
Morrissey did not enter a plea of guilty but was found guilty after a jury trial). 
1 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2-3.) A Criminal Complaint was 
filed charging Mr. Morrissey with one count of conspiracy to commit arson and one 
count of arson. (R., pp.7-9.) A preliminary hearing was held, Mr. Morrissey was bound 
over into the district court and an Information was filed charging Mr. Morrissey with the 
above crimes and with being a persistent violator of the law. (R., pp.35-43.) A jury 
found Mr. Morrissey guilty of both charges and with being a persistent violator. 
(R., pp.180, 182-183; seealsogenerallyTr. Trial.) 
The PSI included records showing that, beginning as a young child, 
Mr. Morrissey had stays in hospitals due to mental health problems and symptoms 
including self-destructive behaviors. (PSI, pp.11-12, 46-68.)2 However, the most recent 
assessment provided to the district court was conducted in June of 2004, just before 
Mr. Morrissey's 18th birthday, and over four years prior to the sentencing hearing in this 
case. (PSI, pp.1, 46-48.) Mr. Morrissey himself expressed a desire for a mental health 
assessment and counseling and the PSI writer agreed that he may benefit from such an 
assessment. (PSI, p.15.) Prior to pronouncing sentence, the district court noted that 
Mr. Morrissey had a "kind of Jekyll and Hyde element going on in [his] life," stated that 
the court was aware that Mr. Morrissey had a history of mental ·issues and wondered if 
those problems are still present, and expressed a belief that Mr. Morrissey needed to be 
under the control of the parole board for a long time, "because I don't understand, at this 
juncture, what is driving Patrick Morrissey." (Tr. 8/5/08, p.544, L.4 - p.545, L.13, p.549, 
L.22 - p.550, L.16.) 
The district court sentenced Mr. Morrissey to a unified term of fifteen years, with 
five years fixed, on each count, and it ordered those sentences to run concurrently with 
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each other, but consecutively to prior sentences that were executed as a result of 
probation violations stemming in part from this new conviction. (R., pp.199-204; 
Tr. 8/5/08, p.550, Ls.17-24.) This appeal follows. (R., pp.236-239)3 
2 Citations to the PSI in this brief correspond to the pages listed in the electronic file 
"Confidential Exhibits Supreme Court No. 38799-2011" created for this appeal. 
3 See n.1, supra. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err by failing to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-2522, as the court had reason to believe that Mr. Morrissey's mental 
condition would be a significant factor at sentencing, and was the error 
harmless? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred By Failing To Order A Mental Health Evaluation Pursuant To 
LC.§ 19-2522, As The Court Had Reason To Believe That Mr. Morrissey's Mental 
Condition Would Be A Significant Factor At Sentencing, And The Error Was Not 
Harmless 
A. Introduction 
The district court acknowledged that Mr. Morrissey had a history of mental illness 
and expressed puzzlement at the role his mental illness plays in his life. Mr. Morrissey 
asserts that the court erred in failing to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-2522, as the court had reason to believe his mental condition would be a 
significant factor at sentence. Furthermore, the information about Mr. Morrissey's 
mental condition that the court did have was insufficient to comply with the requirements 
of I.C. § 19-2522(3) and, therefore, the error was not harmless. 
B. The District Court Erred By Failing To Order A Mental Health Evaluation 
Pursuant To I.C. § 19-2522, As The Court Had Reason To Believe That 
Mr. Morrissey's Mental Condition Would Be A Significant Factor At Sentencing 
Patrick Morrissey was born a "'blue baby"' as he was deprived of oxygen at birth 
due to the umbilical cord being wrapped around his neck. (PSI, p.11.) He has suffered 
from a seizure disorder, including grand mal seizures, since the age of four. (PSI, 
pp.SO, 55, 57, 62.) His parents separated when he was six or seven years old due to 
his father being physically violent towards his mother. (PSI, p.6.) Mr. Morrissey 
struggled in school, was involved in special education classes, and was diagnosed as 
dyslexic. (PSI, p.9.) At one point in his childhood, Mr. Morrissey lived with his father 
who turned his violence toward him, striking young Patrick in the head with a frying pan 
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and/or a golf club, which may have been the cause of the temporal lobe brain damage 
that he suffers. (PSI, pp.7, 50.) 
Mr. Morrissey had three separate placements in mental health facilities in the 
State of Texas as a pre-teen, prior to moving to Idaho. (PSI, pp.53-54, 57, 62.) In 
October of 1999, then 13-year-old Patrick Morrissey was brought into the emergency 
department of the Kootenai Medical Center for "rather bizarre behavior," as he 
attempted to harm his younger sister and threatened to kill himself. (PSI, p.49.) He 
was admitted for "bipolar disorder with suicidal ideation and seizure disorder." 
(R., p.50.) Mr. Morrissey reported at that time that he had been suicidal in the past. 
(PSI, p.53.) About a week into his three-week stay at the Kootenai Medical Center, 
Mr. Morrissey had an episode where he vomited several times and became more 
irritable and aggressive, requiring mechanical restraint and seclusion. (PSI, pp.57-58.) 
Two weeks after he was discharged, Mr. Morrissey was again admitted into the 
Kootenai County Medical Center due to "severe noncompliance and disruption, that 
escalated into physical aggression, including requiring several restraints and p.r.n.'s." 
(R., p.60.) Mr. Morrissey spent one week at the hospital and, 
initially, was extremely irritable and noncompliant, as well as being very 
aggressive. Throughout the course of this hospitalization this gradually 
improved. He was still having difficulty, even up to the time of discharge, 
for example (sic) had five quiet times the evening prior to discharge. 
(PSI, p.60.) Three months later, Mr. Morrissey was again admitted into the Kootenai 
Medical Center, this time for a five-day period, "following [an] episode of severe 
disruption and out-of-control behavior including aggression and deliberately trying to 
harm himself. (PSI, p.66.) He tried to bang his broken leg against a wall and had to be 
restrained. (PSI, p.68.) During the course of his three stays at the Kootenai Medical 
Center, 13 year-old Patrick Morrissey was diagnosed with Bipolar disorder, by history, 
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secondary to central nervous system damage; ADHD; disruptive behavior disorder, 
secondary to neurological difficulties; affective disorder, secondary to neurological 
difficulties; and, other specified family circumstances." (PSI, pp.55-56, 58, 61, 63 and 
66.) 
In June of 2004, now living in Twin Falls, an almost 18-year-old Mr. Morrissey got 
drunk with a friend, and then started "hitting his head on the curb" and had to be taken 
to the Magic Valley Regional Medical Center. (PSI, pp.46-48.) At that time, 
Mr. Morrissey had been prescribed Prozac, Tegretol, and Zyprexa, but was apparently 
non-compliant in taking his medications. (PSI, p.46.) During his three-day stay, 
Mr. Morrissey made suicidal statements, and initially refused to engage in counseling 
because it involved family sessions. (PSI, p.46.) After the psychiatrist convinced 
Mr. Morrissey to agree to follow his family's rules, he was discharged. (PSI, pp.47-48.) 
Although it does not appear that the evaluator was aware of the full extent of 
Mr. Morrissey's mental illness history, the evaluator recommended that Mr. Morrissey 
be "sent to a penal institution rather than a mental institution" should he "engage in 
recurrent illegal activity." (PSI, pp.46-48.) 
Idaho Code § 19-2522( 1) reads, in relevant part, as follows: 
If there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will be a 
significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown, the court shall 
appoint at least one (1) psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine 
and report upon the mental condition of the defendant. 
I.C. § 19-2522(1) (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that the 
decision to order an evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 may be discretionary in some 
circumstances; however, where the defendant's mental health condition will be a 
significant sentencing factor, the statute mandates that the district court order a 19-2522 
evaluation. State v. Hanson, Idaho_, 2012 Opinion No. 10, pp.4-5 (January 6, 
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2012) (citations omitted). By the plain language of the statute itself, the obligation to 
order an evaluation is upon the sentencing court and is not dependent upon a request 
from either the State or the defendant. I.C. § 19-2522(1).4 
The district court had a mountain of evidence showing that Patrick Morrissey has 
long-suffered from both physical and mental illness. Doctors had prescribed or forced 
Mr. Morrissey to take a cornucopia of medications including: Phenobarbital, Carbatrol, 
Niacinamide, Thorazine, Ritalin, Prozac, Depakote, Clonidine (possibly), Synthroid, 
Neurontin, Tegretol, Ativan, Lamictal and Droperidol - all before the age of fourteen. 
(PSI, pp.49-50, 53, 60, 62, 66.) There was ample reason to believe that Mr. Morrissey's 
mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing. 
In fact, the district court recognized that Mr. Morrissey had mental health 
problems, but had no idea what roll his mental illness played in the nature of the crime, 
let alone the character of Mr. Morrissey. "A district court's decisions or comments at 
sentencing may also demonstrate that the defendant's mental condition was a 
significant factor in determining the sentence." Hanson, _Idaho at_, 2012 Opinion 
No. 10 at 6. During the sentencing hearing, the district court stated the following: 
Your life has been a difficult one. I have very carefully read this 
presentence investigation. I have gone back and I've looked at the history 
of these other cases and I'm not sure what it is that causes your 
conduct, but it's clear that it's been there for years. There is an 
4 In contrast to the plain language of I.C. § 19-2522 placing the burden of the court, the 
plain language Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the district court to receive evidence of 
the defendant's mental condition only "if offered," indicating that the duty in the first 
instance belongs to defense counsel to offer such evidence under that statute. 
I.C. § 19-2523. Despite the plain language of I.C. § 19-2522, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has developed jurisprudence requiring a defendant to demonstrate that the 
district court showed "manifest disregard" for Idaho Criminal Rule 32 in failing to sua 
sponte order a 19-2522 evaluation. See generally State v. Rollins, 152 Idaho 106 
(Ct. App. 2011). Because this appeal is filed in the Idaho Supreme Court and because 
the Idaho Supreme Court has never adopted the "manifest disregard" of I.C.R. 32 
jurisprudence, Mr. Morrissey will make no further reference to that standard in this brief. 
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element of kind of a Jekyll and Hyde element going on in your life. If 
I listen to the people that know you like your mother, the mother of your 
child and your friends and so forth, they think that Patrick Morrissey is just 
a fine, young man and has had a tough life and deserves a break and so 
forth and so forth. If I look at the history of this case in terms of your 
conduct with the legal system, you're the Hyde because you've had 
nothing but problems in schooling, problems in the juvenile system. 
I've looked at this case from the standpoint of is there something 
in Patrick Morrissey's life that would be cause him to do these 
things? In other words, are there mental problems? I'm aware that 
you have a history in that area. I've looked very carefully at the 
evaluations of Dr. Heidenreich that was done a couple of years ago and 
the Canyon View reports and so forth. Frankly, I was astounded to see in 
Dr. Heidenreich's report the statement that he prosecutor quoted, that if 
you have further problems in life you need to go to a penal institution. I 
don't know that I've ever seen that out of a psychiatrist. It tells me 
something about your character that I think really does influence my 
decision. 
(Tr. 8/5/08, p.544, L.4 - p.545, L.13 (emphasis added).) The Court continued, 
I do think that you need to be under the control of a parole board for 
a long period of time because I don't understand, at this juncture, what 
is driving Patrick Morrissey. If, in fact, what is going on in your life and 
in your mind is a young man who has just not felt the impact, if you will, of 
punishment and thinks that you can get away with anything and that after 
a period of incarceration your eyes are going to get opened and you're 
going to decide that's not the way to live, then imposing a long fixed period 
in the penitentiary would not be appropriate. 
On the other hand, if what I read in these re~orts is true, that you 
are a person with an antisocial personality disorder who basically is not 
going to pay attention to anything anybody says, including the parole 
board, this court, or anybody else, then any (sic) lengthy period to protect 
society is in order. It's between those two things that I've wrestled with 
this case since I heard this jury's verdict as to what to do with you. 
(Tr. 8/5/08, p.549, L.22 - p.550, L.16.) There is no question that Mr. Morrissey's 
mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing. The district court 
5 Mr. Morrissey has never been diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder. (PSI, 
pp.46-68.) 
9 
acknowledged as much and yet the court failed to abide by the plain language of Idaho 
Code § 19-2522 by ordering a mental health evaluation pursuant to that statute. 
C. The Information Supplied To The District Court Did Not Adequately Substitute 
For The Information Required By I.C. § 19-2522 And The District Court's Error Is 
Not Harmless 
Idaho Code§ 19-2522(3) reads as follows: 
The report of the examination shall include the following: 
{a) A description of the nature of the examination; 
(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of the 
defendant; 
(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect and level 
of functional impairment; 
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the defendant's 
mental condition; 
(e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or 
nontreatment; 
(f) A consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant may create 
for the public if at large. 
I.C. § 19-2522 (3). If the information provided to the district court through other means 
satisfies the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3), the failure of the district court to order a 
new mental health evaluation, where the defendant's mental condition will be a 
significant factor at sentencing, will be considered harmless error. Hanson, _Idaho at 
_, 2012 Opinion No. 10 at 12-13 (citing State v. Harper, 129 Idaho 86, 91 (1996)); 
see also State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Although the district court had an abundance of mental health evaluations, most 
had been prepared approximately nine years earlier, when Mr. Morrissey was 13, and 
the most recent evaluation was prepared more than four years prior, when 
10 
Mr. Morrissey was just shy of his 18th birthday. (PSI, pp.1, 46-68.) All of the reports 
dealt with the immediate needs of young Patrick, including dealing with his suicidal 
attempts and ideations, and his erratic and bizarre behaviors apparently set-off by 
rather benign occurrences. Id. The mere fact that there are at least fourteen 
documented medications that Patrick Morrissey had been prescribed (or forced to take) 
suggests strongly that Mr. Morrissey may be in need of an evaluation to determine what 
medications he should now be taking. (PSI, pp.46, 49-50, 53, 60, 62, 66.) The opinion 
of Dr. Heidenreich that the district court found so compelling was apparently based 
upon a lack of a full understanding of Mr. Morrissey's history on the part of that doctor, 
who acknowledged only that he has a history of conduct disorders, medications, suicide 
attempts, and arrests. (PSI, pp.46-48.) 
In short, the information contained in the mental health related documents 
included with the PSI, though showing a long history of mental illness, was stale at best 
and did not provide an updated analysis of a description of the nature of the 
examination, the prognosis of his mental condition of the defendant, the degree of his 
illness and functional impairment, consideration of treatment options or analysis of the 
risks and benefits of treatment or non-treatment, or a consideration of Mr. Morrissey's 
risk to the public at large, as required by 19-2522(3). (Compare R., pp.46-68 with 
I.C. § 19-2522(3).) Thus, the district court's error in failing to order a 19-2522 evaluation 
was not harmless. 
The district court erred by failing to order a 19-2522 evaluation of Mr. Morrissey 
and the error is not harmless. Therefore, this Court should remand this case back to 
the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
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11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Morrissey asserts that, in light of the mitigating evidence, the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of 
society; (2) deterrence of the defendant and others; (3) the possibility of the defendant's 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. State v. Strand, 137 
Idaho 457, 460-61 (2002). 
In addition to the extensive mental health issues that Mr. Morrissey suffers from, 
described in section I above and incorporated herein by reference thereto, which should 
be considered as a mitigating factor, see Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999), 
Mr. Morrissey asserts that additional mitigating evidence should have counseled the 
district court to impose a less-severe sentence. As mentioned before, Mr. Morrissey 
was just 22-years-old at the time of sentencing, but he had a long history or being under 
the influence of controlled substances, prescribed or otherwise. (PSI, pp.1, 12-13, 23-
26.) It was recommended that Mr. Morrissey participate in relapse prevention and 
attend AA and NA meetings. (R., p.26.) Mr. Morrissey enjoys the support of his family 
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as his fiance, Amanda Fomichev, and his mother, Mary Jones, wrote letters in support 
of him. (PSI, pp.17-20.) Idaho courts recognize that a defendant's young age, 
substance abuse problem, and family support are all mitigating factors that the district 
court should consider in imposing sentence. See State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 
126 (1980); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-
595 (1982). In light of all of the mitigating factors present in his case, Mr. Morrissey 
asserts that the district court imposed an excessive sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Morrissey respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district 
court for a new sentencing hearing with instructions that the district court order the 
required evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2522. Alternatively, Mr. Morrissey 
requests that this Court reduce his sentence as this Court deems appropriate. 
DATED this 29th day of February, 2012. 
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